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In order to interpret a constantly changing environment, visual events far apart in space
and time must be integrated into a uniﬁed percept. While spatial properties of invisible sig-
nals are known to be encoded without awareness, the fate of temporal properties remains
largely unknown. Here, we probed temporal integration for two distinct motion stimuli
that were either visible or rendered invisible using continuous ﬂash suppression. We found
that when invisible, both the direction of apparent motion and the gender of point-light
walkers were processed only when deﬁned across short time periods (i.e., respectively
100 ms and 1000 ms). This limitation was not observed under full visibility. These similar
ﬁndings at two different hierarchical levels of processing suggest that temporal integration
windows shrink in the absence of perceptual awareness. We discuss this phenomenon as a
key prediction of the global neuronal workspace and the information integration theories
of consciousness.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
When one is immersed in a visual environment, the
optical ﬂow is constantly changing as objects move and
as one moves in relation to these objects, deﬁning tempo-
ral structures (Blake & Lee, 2005). Processing these dy-
namic cues implies the existence of temporal integration
windows within which different aspects of the signal
changing over time (e.g., successive positions of a point
of light) are integrated into a uniﬁed percept (e.g., a mov-
ing point). The duration of integration windows can be de-
ﬁned as the maximal delay between two events for which a
response differs from the summed responses associated
with each event. This reﬂects the fact that visual features
conveyed by temporal structures are not deﬁned at any
one point in time, but are emergent properties of temporalintegration. We followed this logic and measured temporal
integration for apparent and biological motion. In apparent
motion, light points alternating between non-contiguous
spatial locations are not perceived as ﬂickering, but as
moving back and forth (Anstis, 1980). For instance, if two
vertically aligned dots are presented alternatively on either
side of a virtual rectangle, with a delay less than the tem-
poral integration window, one does not perceive two pairs
of dots ﬂickering out of phase, but two single dots moving
back and forth along the rectangle’s horizontal axis. Per-
ceiving such motion implies that the location of the ﬁrst
point remains available until the second appears (i.e., the
signal must be integrated over this duration). In addition,
the correspondence between dots must be established, so
that the same identity is attributed to two dots from pairs
seen at different locations and times (Dawson, 1991). In
the given example, a strong bias for horizontal correspon-
dence between the dots creates the percept of horizontal
motion, although the display could be as well interpreted
as two dots moving along the diagonals of the rectangle.
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walkers are points of light representing the structural
arrangement of the main joints of a walker across time
(Johansson, 1973). Despite their simplicity, one can per-
ceive the gender of point-light walkers, both using struc-
tural cues (e.g., the shoulder–hip ratio, larger for males)
and kinematic cues (e.g., the lateral body sway, more pro-
nounced for females) (Mather & Murdoch, 1994; Troje,
2002). While structural cues are encoded by the spatial
relationships between light points, and are therefore avail-
able at each individual image frame, kinematic cues only
arise when integrating information across frames. Hence,
one can study spatial and temporal integration from struc-
turally and kinematically deﬁned point-light walkers,
respectively.
Static spatial features that are deﬁned at any point in
time (e.g., location, orientation, color) are known to be en-
coded and integrated into objects even when these are per-
ceptually invisible (see Lin & He, 2009 for a review). Yet,
the integration of such invisible static features into dy-
namic features (e.g., motion speed, direction, synchrony)
has not hitherto been addressed.
In order to assess the role of awareness during temporal
integration, we used apparent and biological motion that
were either fully visible or rendered invisible by continu-
ous ﬂash suppression (CFS). In CFS, a stream of salient pat-
terns ﬂashed to the dominant eye renders the signal
presented to the non-dominant eye invisible (Tsuchiya &
Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy, & Blake, 2006). Relying
on previous results (Anstis, Giaschi, & Cogan, 1985; Blake,
Ahlström, & Alais, 1999; Geisler, 1999; Jordan, Fallah, &
Stoner, 2006; Kruse, Stadler, & Wehner, 1986; Rajimehr,
Vaziri-Pashkam, Afraz, & Esteky, 2004; Ramachandran,
1975; Troje, Sadr, Geyer, & Nakayama, 2006; Wiesenfelder
& Blake, 1991), we assumed that in the presence of tempo-
ral integration, being exposed to apparent motion with a
particular direction or a point-light walker with kinematic
features (hereafter the adaptor) would bias the way subse-
quent ambiguous motion is perceived (i.e., apparent mo-
tion with ambiguous direction, or point-light walkers
with ambiguous gender). By varying parametrically the
kinematics and visibility of apparent and biological motion
adaptors, we could quantitatively estimate the extent of
temporal integration with and without awareness.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Healthy volunteers with normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity were recruited from the campus student pop-
ulation (age range: 18–30). Twenty participants were in-
cluded in the apparent motion experiments (8 in the
visible condition, 12 in the invisible condition, 3 females
in each group). Fifty-eight participants were included in
the biological motion experiments (visible condition: 9
for structural and kinematic point-light walkers (4 fe-
males), 8 for structural point-light walkers (4 females), 7
for kinematic point-light walkers (4 females); invisible
condition: 7 for structural and kinematic point-lightwalkers (5 females), 8 for structural point-light walkers
(5 females), 9 for kinematic point-light walkers (5 fe-
males); 10 for visible and invisible slow kinematic
point-light walkers (1 female)). Subjects were naive to
the purpose of these experiments, and gave informed writ-
ten consent. All experiments conformed to Institutional
Guidelines and to the Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2. Apparatus
Stimuli were presented using Matlab and the Psycho-
physics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Participants’
heads were stabilized using a chinrest located 57 cm away
from a 1900 CRT screen (resolution 1024  768; 100 Hz re-
fresh rate). A mirror stereoscope was used to present
images separately to each eye.
2.3. Continuous ﬂash suppression
A frame composed of textured black and white bars
(0.58 width) was presented to each eye to facilitate stable
fusion. Each trial started with a key press, once participants
made sure that a ﬁxation dot presented to the dominant
eye (0.23 diameter) was centered within a circle pre-
sented to the non-dominant eye (1.16 diameter). CFS pat-
terns consisted of arrays of 600 randomly generated disks
(from 0.08 to 1.16 diameter) of different shades of gray
ﬂashed at 10 Hz to the dominant eye.
2.4. Apparent motion
2.4.1. Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of disks of 1.55 diameter, 0.23
Michelson contrast, convoluted with a Gaussian alpha
mask (sigma = 0.96). In the adaptation phase, the illusion
of horizontal apparent motion was produced by presenting
these disks for 100 ms alternatively on the long edges of an
imaginary rectangle, while vertical apparent motion was
produced by presenting them on the short edges.
2.4.2. Aspect ratio procedure
Before the adaptation phase, the rectangle’s aspect-ra-
tio was adapted for each observer so that on average, dura-
tions of vertical and horizontal motion perception were
equal (aspect ratio procedure, see Kohler, Haddad, Singer,
& Muckli, 2008). For this purpose, two disks were pre-
sented at a time, on diagonally opposite corners of an
imaginary rectangle, leading to a bistable alternation of
horizontal and vertical motion (motion quartet, see Kruse
et al., 1986). First, a motion quartet with an aspect ratio
of 1 was presented, (8.7 horizontal and vertical distances
between the disks), leading to unambiguous perception of
vertical motion. Observers had to report the direction of
the quartet motion continuously by holding one of two
directional keys. After each period of 2 s, the vertical dis-
tance was increased or decreased by 0.4 in order to com-
pensate for the dominant direction perceived during this
time window. The optimal aspect ratio was chosen as the
average of the vertical distances across ten perceptual
reversals (i.e., switch from vertical to horizontal direction).
On average, the vertical to horizontal average ratio was
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with a constant horizontal distance of 8.7, and an average
vertical distance across subjects of 12.12.2.4.3. Adaptation phase procedure
Two pairs of disks were presented for 100 ms alterna-
tively on the long edges (horizontal apparent motion), or
on the short edges (vertical apparent motion) of the opti-
mal rectangle deﬁned above. An adaptor with four disks
presented simultaneously was used as a baseline (no mo-
tion, ﬂicker condition). In order to vary parametrically
the temporal structure of apparent motion adaptors, 100,
400, 800, or 1200 ms blank periods were added between
the onset of successive pairs of disks (i.e., inter-stimulus
interval (ISI), see Fig. 1). Apparent motion adaptors were
presented for 20 s. This duration was determined from pi-
lot experiments as the maximal duration allowing for
invisibility under CFS. While the non-dominant eye always
received the apparent motion adaptor, the dominant eye
received either a static homogeneous gray background inFig. 1. Experimental paradigm for apparent motion. While the non-
dominant eye receives the adapting stimulus (the adaptor, here with a
vertical direction), the dominant eye receives either a static homogeneous
gray background (visible condition) or a stream of salient patterns
(invisible condition, as depicted here). Observers had to indicate the
adaptor’s direction of motion by a key press (providing a measure for
objective accuracy). They could provide an answer at any time during the
20 s; we counted only the ﬁnal one. Subsequently, the red ﬁxation dot
turned green, and a mask consisting of four simultaneous disks followed
by a blank was presented, so that the last position of the adaptor could
not inﬂuence subsequent events. Participants had to report continuously
whether they perceived the probe as moving vertically or horizontally
during 15 s. In the invisible condition, each trial ended with a question
asking participants if they had no perceptual experience of motion, a brief
glimpse, an almost clear image, or a perfectly clear image of the adaptor
(subjective visibility, see methods). (For interpretation of the references to
color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)the visible condition, or a stream of CFS patterns in the
invisible condition. At any point during the 20 s of display,
participants had to indicate the adaptor’s motion direction
by pressing one of three keys (i.e., vertical motion, horizon-
tal motion, or ﬂicker). This provided an objective measure
reﬂecting the participants’ capacity to discriminate the
direction of apparent motion (i.e., hereafter objective accu-
racy). Participants were asked to guess even though they
could not see the adaptor. If several key presses occurred,
the last one was considered as reﬂecting the participant’s
ﬁnal decision. If no key press occured, the trial was rejected
from further analysis, and participants were reminded to
provide an answer in the next trials. After the adaptor, a
500 ms mask (i.e., four simultaneous disks) followed by a
500 ms blank were presented in order to reduce the inﬂu-
ence of low-level similarities shared between adaptors and
probes (i.e., so that the very last position of the adaptor’s
disks could not inﬂuence subsequent events). Motion quar-
tet probes were presented during 15 s with a constant ISI
of 200 ms, allowing for several perceptual alternations to
occur, and therefore have a continuous measure of adapta-
tion. Participants reported whether they perceived vertical
or horizontal motion of the probe during 15 s, by holding
continuously one of two directional keys. The experiment
contained 72 trials and lasted around 1 h. The different
adaptors were presented in randomized order. In the invis-
ible condition, participants were asked to indicate their
subjective experience of the apparent motion adaptor
(Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004): they pressed a key from 1
to 4, corresponding respectively to ‘‘no perceptual experi-
ence’’, ‘‘a brief glimpse’’, ‘‘an almost clear image’’, or ‘‘a per-
fectly clear image’’ of apparent motion.
2.4.4. Statistical analysis
Participants reported the direction of the probe by con-
tinuously holding one of two directional keys (i.e., vertical
or horizontal motion). Key presses were recorded every
50 ms. Based on this time series, we computed an adapta-
tion index reﬂecting at each time stamp the congruency
between the subjective report of the probe’s direction
and the direction of the adaptor: a value of 1 was as-
signed if both were identical (i.e., a participant reporting
seeing the probe as moving vertically after a vertical adap-
tor), and 1 if they were opposite (i.e., a participant report-
ing seeing the probe as moving horizontally after a vertical
adaptor). Time stamps for which no answer was provided
were considered as missing values, so that the estimation
of the adaptation index was not biased (e.g., during a
switch between two key presses). We estimated potential
perceptual biases for horizontal or vertical motion by mea-
suring subjective reports of the probe’s direction after a
baseline adaptor containing no motion (i.e., ﬂicker
condition, see above). Such biases were subtracted from
the adaptation index. Adaptation indices were computed
individually for each ISI condition, and then compared at
the group level using repeated measures analysis of vari-
ance. In the invisible condition, we discarded trials in
which performance on the objective accuracy task was be-
yond 45% in a given subjective visibility category. In addi-
tion, three participants were excluded, as their global
objective accuracy was signiﬁcantly above chance-level
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sis was performed using Matlab and R.
2.5. Biological motion
2.5.1. Stimuli
Point-light walkers consisted in arrays of 15 dots, gen-
erated using the method developed by Troje (2002,
2008). Once recorded with a 9-camera motion capture sys-
tem (Vicon 512, Oxford Metrics), the structure (i.e., deﬁned
by the dots’ position) and kinematics (i.e., deﬁned by the
dots’ motion) of 100 walkers (50 females) were projected
in a parametric space using discrete Fourier decomposi-
tion. By convention, the average point-light walker was
considered at the position 0 along an axis deﬁning gender
characteristics and consisted of 15 points. Position 1 cor-
responds to a walker 1 standard deviation (SD) away from
the mean towards the female part of the axis, and aFig. 2. Adaptation to visible and invisible apparent motion. (a) Time-course of th
panel). Positive values on the vertical axis reﬂect the fraction of trials in whic
adaptor. Red, yellow, green, and blue curves represent adaptors with an ISI o
correspond to one standard error of the mean (SEM). (b) Objective accuracy meas
(see methods). Error bars stand for SEM. The dashed line corresponds to chance
adaptation index over the 15 s of probe display in the visible (left panel) and invis
the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web veposition of +1 refers to a walker 1 SD away from the mean
towards the male part of the gender axis. Following previ-
ous results and taking into account biases in gender per-
ception (Troje et al., 2006), we deﬁned the female
adaptor as 7 SD, and the male adaptor as +5 SD. Similarly,
probes were deﬁned at ﬁve equidistant steps from 3 SD
(female) to +1 SD (male). Across the different experiments,
adaptors and probes always contained the same gender
information: either both structural and kinematic cues,
structural cues only (i.e., structural cues of the speciﬁc gen-
der, combined with kinematic cues of the average walker
which are neutral in terms of gender), or kinematic cues
only (i.e., structural cues of the average walker which are
neutral in terms of gender, combined with kinematic cues
of the speciﬁc gender, see Fig. 3b). The global size of adap-
tor and probes point-light walkers was 2.6  7.1. Each of
the 15 constituting dots was 0.23 (Michelson contrast:
0.08 for adaptors, 0.36 for probes). In the fast kinematice adaptation index in the visible (left panel) and invisible condition (right
h the probe was perceived as moving in the opposite direction than the
f 100 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms, and 1200 ms respectively. The colored bands
ures in the visible and invisible conditions after excluding irrelevant trials
-level performance (i.e., 33%, for 3 different adaptors). (c) Average of the
ible condition (right panel). Error bars stand for SEM. (For interpretation of
rsion of this article.)
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100 Hz, so that a new array of 15 dots was presented every
10 ms, and one walk cycle was 1 s. In the slow kinematic
condition, the temporal sampling rate for the adaptor
was 33 Hz, so that a new array of 15 dots was presented
every 33 ms, and one walk cycle was 3 s. The temporal
sampling rate for the probe was always 100 Hz (i.e., 1 s
walk cycle).
2.5.2. Adaptation phase procedure
Point-light walker adaptors were presented for 3 s, dur-
ing which they underwent three walk cycles in the fast
kinematic condition, or one walk cycle in the slow kine-
matic condition. The duration of 3 s was determined from
pilot experiments as the maximal duration allowing for
invisibility under CFS. After a blank of 200 ms, a point-light
walker probe was presented for 0.7 s, during which it
underwent a fraction of 0.7 walk cycle.
Unlike the apparent motion experiment, no mask was
added between the adaptor and the probe, as they did not
share the exact same position and kinematics (i.e., we could
rule out low-level confounds, unlike in the apparentmotion
experiment). We aimed at maximizing our chance to detect
adaptation rather than equating perfectly the two experi-
ments, for which stimuli differ in many ways (see discus-
sion). These parameters were chosen relying on the study
by Troje et al. (2006). Adaptors were presented in a pseu-
do-randomized order, with no more than 3 successive rep-
etitions of a same gender. The visible condition contained
100 trials, while the invisible conditions comprised 200 tri-
als in order to increase signal to noise ratio.
2.5.3. Statistical analysis
We excluded trials for which the reaction time on the
probe was below 200 ms, or beyond 3 standard deviationsFig. 3. Experimental paradigm for biological motion. (a) While the non-dominan
dominant eye received either a gray background (visible condition), or a strea
stimulus in the non-dominant eye. Following a blank of 0.2 s, the probe was pre
probe’s perceived gender, and then report their subjective percept of the adapt
walker, a brief glimpse, an almost clear image, or a perfectly clear image of it.
measure). (b) Schematic description of male point-light walkers (top-row, in blue
structural (colored dots) and kinematic cues (colored arrows), structural cues o
cues), or kinematic cues (black dots corresponding to neutral structural cues wi
dots depicting the hips in female vs. male walkers in the structural condition, and
of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the webfrom the mean (Whelan, 2010). The shape of the psycho-
metric function was derived for each participant using a
two-parameter logistic function in which the lower limit
was ﬁxed at 0 (i.e., for male probes at +1 SD) and the upper
limit was ﬁxed at 1 (i.e., for female probes at 3 SD). The
midpoint of the logistic function across participants was
used as a measure for the point of subjective equality. Ef-
fects were quantiﬁed as the average difference between
points of subjective equality shift following male and fe-
male adaptors. The slope of the function at the midpoint
was taken as a measure for the discriminability of male
and female probes. No effect of discriminability was found
in any of the conditions (ps > 0.1). Signiﬁcance within a
group of participants was tested using two-sample paired
t-tests. Post-hoc comparisons between groups of partici-
pants were made using Welch two sample t-tests. Statisti-
cal analysis was performed using R (R Foundation for
Statistical Computing, 2013, Vienna, Austria).3. Results
3.1. Apparent motion
On each trial, observers guessed the direction of the
apparent motion adaptor (objective accuracy measure),
and indicated how visible it was (subjective visibility mea-
sure, see Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). The use of objective
accuracy and subjective visibility measures allowed for a
reliable estimation of awareness at the single trial level.
Here, chance-level in objective accuracy was 33%, as par-
ticipants could choose between three alternatives: hori-
zontal, vertical, or no apparent motion (see methods). In
the visible condition (i.e., with no CFS), observers had a
global objective accuracy of 98.4% (SE = 0.47), revealing
that they could detect the direction of apparent motiont eye received the adaptor – 15 light points in each frame – during 3 s, the
m of salient patterns (invisible condition, as depicted here) masking the
sented to the non-dominant eye for 0.7 s. Observers had to categorize the
or, by indicating whether they have had no perceptual experience of the
Finally, observers had to guess the adaptor’s gender (objective accuracy
) and female point-light walkers (bottom-row, in red), either deﬁned with
nly (colored dots with black arrows corresponding to neutral kinematic
th colored arrows). For instance, note the bigger spacing between the two
their different trajectories in the kinematic condition. (For interpretation
version of this article.)
N. Faivre, C. Koch / Cognition 131 (2014) 404–414 409in all ISI conditions (Fig. 2b). In the invisible condition (i.e.,
with CFS), observers reported having no experience of the
adaptor in 66.2% (SE = 9.72) of trials. The average objective
accuracy for these trials was 29.5% (SE = 3.28, with chance
being 33.3%, see Fig. 2b). Observers reported perceiving a
brief glimpse in 20.6% (SE = 6.09) of trials, with an objective
accuracy of 40.3% (SE = 7.76), an almost clear image in 9.7%
of trials (SE = 3.76), with an objective accuracy of 49.9%
(SE = 8.43), and an absolute clear image in 3.5% of trials
(SE = 2.73), with an objective accuracy of 39.7%
(SE = 13.59). Subjective visibility and objective accuracy
were related (linear regression analysis: adjusted
R2 = 0.997, p = 0.025, the trials in which an ‘‘absolute clear
image’’ was perceived were ignored because too rare for an
accurate estimation of objective accuracy). After excluding
cases of residual awareness (see methods), adaptors in the
remaining trials were fully invisible (mean accu-
racy = 33.07%, p = 0.97). Importantly, we veriﬁed that ISI
had no inﬂuence on subjective visibility (proportion of tri-
als with no phenomenal experience of the adaptor:
F(3,33) = 1.33, p = 0.28). In addition, the interaction be-
tween ISI and objective accuracy was not signiﬁcant
(F(3,33) = 2.39, p = 0.09). If anything, the trend for an inter-
action was driven by a surprising decrease of accuracy for
ISI = 400 ms (26% (SE = 3.9) compared to 35% (SE = 3.1) for
ISI = 100 ms, 35% (SE = 2.7) for ISI = 800 ms, and 36%
(SE = 3.4) for ISI = 1200 ms, none of them being signiﬁ-
cantly higher than chance-level, with all ps > 0.4). Overall,
we can assume with reasonable conﬁdence that objective
accuracy was not consistently correlated with ISI.
We then estimated the adaptation index, reﬂecting
whether the probe was perceived with the same or oppo-
site direction compared to the adaptor (see methods). We
found a signiﬁcant adaptation effect from the adaptor (re-
peated measures ANOVA, adaptation index = 0.097,
F(1,7) = 8.08, p = 0.025), with no interaction with ISI
(F(3,21) = 0.31, p = 0.82) (Fig. 2a and c). This reﬂects a
repulsive, adaptation effect, whereby an ambiguous probe
is perceived as horizontal after a vertical adaptor, and vice
versa. Importantly, the absence of interaction with the ISI
shows that this adaptation effect occurs irrespectively of
the apparent motion kinematics. By contrast, in the invisi-
ble condition, we found an interaction of the adaptation in-
dex with ISI (one-way ANOVA, F(3,33) = 6.06, p = 0.002),
revealing signiﬁcant adaptation only for ISI = 100 ms
(adaptation index = 0.10, standard error (SE) = 0.031,
t(11) = 3.38, p = 0.007; other ISI: all ps > 0.2, see Fig. 2c).
Surprisingly, adaptation to visible and invisible apparent
motion was of similar amplitude at ISI = 100 ms (Welch
two sample t-test, t(10.01) = 0.13, p = 0.90, see discussion).
Although average adaptation is far from being signiﬁcant
for ISI = 1200 ms (p > 0.2), it is of note that the adaptation
index diverged from baseline for a short duration around
8 s after adaptor offset (Fig. 2a, right panel, blue trace). This
signal is hard to interpret, as we would expect adaptation
to arise early after the adaptor offset, and to be sustained
over time, similar to what happens in the 100 ms ISI condi-
tion. This divergence from baseline is therefore likely to re-
ﬂect noisy signal ﬂuctuations. In addition, besides the
differences in terms of adaptation index described above,
we found that visible and invisible adaptors had noinﬂuence on other aspects of the perceptual reports
regarding the probe’s direction (i.e., number and dynamics
of perceptual switches between vertical and horizontal
motion, ps > 0.1). To sum up, these results suggest that
adaptation to visible apparent motion is similar for ISIs be-
tween 100 ms and 1200 ms, while adaptation to invisible
apparent motion occurs only for a short ISI of 100 ms.
3.2. Biological motion
We assessed the generality of our results on apparent
motion by applying the same logic to the perception of bio-
logical motion. Across the different experiments, adaptor
and probe point-light walkers contained either both struc-
tural and kinematic cues, structural cues only (i.e., gender-
speciﬁc structural cues combined with neutral kinematic
cues), or kinematic cues only (i.e., neutral structural cues
combined with gender-speciﬁc kinematic cues) (Fig. 3).
In each case, we computed the point of subjective equality
at which a participant rated a probe to be equally likely
male or female when preceded by a female or a male adap-
tor. Similar to the apparent motion experiment, we made
sure that adaptors were invisible using both subjective
and objective accuracy measures (Fig. 4a). In the visible
condition (i.e., with no CFS), the proportion of trials in
which subjects reported having an almost clear or perfectly
clear image was 97.8% (SE = 0.97) for structural and kine-
matic cues, 99.5% (SE = 0.27) for structural cues only, and
92.4% (SE = 4.64) for kinematic cues only. In the invisible
condition (with CFS), the same proportions fell respectively
to 3.2% (SE = 2.1), 1.4% (SE = 0.64), and 7.2% (SE = 5.40). In
the visible condition, accuracy on the objective accuracy
task for structural and kinematic cues was 97.8%
(SE = 0.84), 98.2% (SE = 0.77) for structural cues only, and
96.8% (SE = 1.5) for kinematic cues only. In the invisible
condition, we discarded trials in which performance on
the objective accuracy task was beyond 60% in a given sub-
jective visibility category. Seven participants were ex-
cluded from the invisible condition, as their global
objective accuracy was signiﬁcantly above chance-level
(mean accuracy = 84%, SE = 2.8, p = 0.001). In the remaining
trials, performance on the objective accuracy task did not
differ from chance level (50%), as it fell respectively to
51.1% for structural and kinematic cues (SE = 1.27,
t(6) = 0.86, p = 0.42), 49.2% for structural cues only
(SE = 0.96, t(7) = 0.78, p = 0.46) and 51.2% for kinematic
cues only (SE = 1.23, t(8) = 1.01, p = 0.34). Regression anal-
yses conﬁrmed the relation between subjective reports and
objective accuracy in the invisible conditions for structural
and kinematic cues (adjusted R2 = 0.62, p = 0.001), struc-
tural cues (adjusted R2 = 0.22, p = 0.057), and kinematic
cues (adjusted R2 = 0.66, p = 0.001). This conﬁrmed that
the gender of the visible adaptors was easily discriminable,
and that CFS successfully masked salient and moving
events like point-light walkers.
Adaptors containing both structural and kinematic cues
induced priming both in the visible (effect = 0.66, SE = 0.16,
two-sample paired t-test t(8) = 4.09, p = 0.003), and invisi-
ble conditions (effect = 0.18, SE = 0.02, t(6) = 10.70,
p = 0.001; two-sample t-test between visible and invisible
condition, t(8.167) = 2.98, p = 0.017) (Fig. 4b). This reﬂects
Fig. 4. Psychometric functions and shifts of perceptual equality. (a) Objective accuracy in the visible and invisible conditions (after excluding trials in which
the adaptor was visible, see methods), for walkers deﬁned by structural and kinematic cues (S + K), structural cues only (S), kinematic cues only (K), and
slow kinematic cues (Slow K). The horizontal dashed line corresponds to chance-level performance (i.e., 50%, for 2 different adaptors). (b) Each graph
represents the proportion of probes categorized as female and the estimated psychometric curve, after adaptation to a male (blue), or female (red) adaptor
in the visible (top row) and invisible condition (bottom row). Vertical lines stand for the perceptual point of equality (i.e., a hypothetical probe categorized
as a female with a probability of 0.5). Units are in standard deviation of gender (SD; see methods). c. Corresponding mean point of subjective equality shifts.
Error bars correspond to SEM. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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perceived as a female after an exaggerated female adaptor,
and vice versa. Due to the constraints imposed by CFS, the
perceptual strength associated with the adaptor had to be
much lower in our paradigm than in other studies measur-
ing adaptation to visible point-light walkers (i.e., 3 s and
0.08 Michelson contrast, compared to 3–14 s and 1
Michelson contrast in the study by Troje et al. (2006),
11.67 s and 1 Michelson contrast in the study by Jordan
et al. (2006)). We thought that this difference could explain
why we found positive priming (i.e., a neutral probe is per-
ceived as female after an exaggerated female adaptor, and
vice versa) while these two other studies reported adapta-
tion (i.e., a neutral probe is perceived as female after an
exaggerated male adaptor, and vice versa). We validated
this hypothesis by running a control experiment, in which
a visible adaptor presented during 7 s at 0.08 Michelson
contrast (i.e., with higher perceptual strength) exerted
not an attractive, but a repulsive effect (effect = 0.74,
t(5) = 2.81, p = 0.038). This result is similar to previous
studies documenting the relationship between visual
adaptation and perceptual strength of orientation features
(Faivre & Kouider, 2011b), faces (Barbot & Kouider, 2012),
or translational motion (Kanai & Verstraten, 2005).
When using adaptors containing only structural cues
(3 s duration), no point of subjective equality shift was ob-
served in the visible (effect = 0.25, SE = 0.46, t(7) = 0.54,p = 0.61) nor the invisible conditions (effect = 0.05,
SE = 0.12, t(7) = 0.42, p = 0.69). The absence of point of
subjective equality shift questions the level at which spa-
tial cues are encoded: possibly, walkers’ gender is inferred
from high-level post-perceptual processes, which are not
at play when judging the gender of subsequent ambiguous
probes. We could test this hypothesis by measuring the
role of high-level cognitive functions in gender after-ef-
fects, relying notably on the application of attentional
loads (e.g., see Bahrami, Carmel, Walsh, Rees, & Lavie,
2008 for the role of attention in tilt after-effects). Another
possible reason for the absence of effect is the uncertainty
with which structurally deﬁned adaptors were perceived,
as revealed by the weak correlation between subjective
visibility and objective accuracy in the visible condition
(adjusted R2 = 0.22, compared to values above 0.6 in the
other conditions, see above).
By contrast, attractive point of subjective equality shifts
were found from adaptors containing kinematic cues only,
both in the visible (effect = 0.85, SE = 0.27, t(6) = 3.19,
p = 0.019) and invisible conditions (effect = 0.32, SE = 0.11,
t(8) = 2.97, p = 0.018; two-sample t-test between visible
and invisible condition, t(8.014) = 1.83, p = 0.105).
Whether temporal integration occurs over the entire dy-
namic structure of the point-light walkers (i.e., the succes-
sive postures of the whole walker), or only the positions of
each individual dot is debated (Giese & Poggio, 2003; Lange
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point-light walkers did not give rise to point of subjective
equality shift, our results tend to support kinematics as
the main property driving gender priming, in accordance
with other studies (Giese & Poggio, 2003; Mather &
Murdoch, 1994; Thurman & Grossman, 2008; Troje,
2002). The importance of kinematic cues for carrying
high-level features in biological motion is supported by a
recent fMRI study. It showed that when rendered invisible
by crowding, dynamic facial expressions (i.e., another kind
of biological motion) are not processed through the ventral
visual pathway, but only through the dorsal visual
pathway which is usually associated with the processing
of motion information (Faivre, Charron, Roux, Lehéricy, &
Kouider, 2012).
In order to examine the extent of temporal integration
for biological motion, we then used adaptors deﬁned by
slower kinematics (one walking cycle in 3 s instead of
1 s). In the visible condition, observers were still able to
discriminate the gender of the adaptor with high accuracy
(90.9%, SE = 2.52), suggesting that the slower kinematics
we employed carried sufﬁcient information for gender dis-
crimination. By contrast, the proportion of trials in which
observers had no experience of the adaptor was similar
for slow and fast kinematics (respectively 81.8% and
88.4%, Welch two sample t-test, t(14.71) = 0.59,
p = 0.56). Furthermore, observers failed to discriminate
the gender of the adaptor in the invisible condition
(51.24%, t(8) = 1.00, p = 0.34), with similar accuracy as for
faster kinematics (Welch two sample t-test,
t(14.55) = 1.27, p = 0.22). This suggests that CFS is equally
potent at suppressing biological motion with fast and slow
kinematics. When using these slower kinematics, we ob-
tained a signiﬁcant point of subjective equality shift in
the visible condition (effect = 0.89, SE = 0.36, t(9) = 2.48,
p = 0.035), but not in the invisible condition (effect = 0.17,
t(9) = 1.02, p = 0.33; paired two-sample t-test between
visible and invisible condition, t(9) = 2.64, p = 0.025). In
addition, we found a signiﬁcant difference in the point of
subjective equality shift between fast and slow kinematics
in the invisible condition (Welch two sample t-test,
t(15.46) = 2.51, p = 0.024), but not in the visible condition
(Welch two sample t-test, t(14.42) = 0.06, p = 0.95). This
shows that the manipulation of stimulus visibility had a
critical impact on the processing of stretched temporal
structures. Overall, as for apparent motion, we conclude
that biological motion deﬁned over long periods of time
is integrated only in the presence of perceptual awareness
(Fig. 4c).1 As a control experiment, we asked a group of 7 new observers to rate
the strength of visible apparent motion from 1 to 4 for each ISI condition.
We found that the illusion of apparent motion decreases linearly when ISI
increases (Adjusted R2 = 0.29, p = 0.002).4. Discussion
Taken together, our results show clear evidence for the
encoding of invisible apparent and biological motion, two
temporal structures deﬁned at distinct levels of visual
processing.
It is of note that our conclusions stem from two para-
digms that differ in several ways, including stimulus prop-
erties and measures of processing. First, apparent motion
adaptors were presented for 20 s, while biological motionadaptors were presented for 3 s. We did not aim to equate
the duration of apparent and biological motion adaptors,
but rather used the maximal duration allowed for each
stimulus to maximize the signal to noise ratio. Considering
the high saliency induced by continuous motion, it is not
surprising that this maximal duration was about an order
of magnitude shorter for biological than for apparent mo-
tion (3 s vs. 20 s). We found that long-lasting apparent mo-
tion adaptors induced repulsive effects (i.e., perceiving the
probe as moving horizontally after a vertical adaptor, and
vice versa), while biological motion adaptors induced
attractive effects (i.e., perceiving the probe as a female
after a female adaptor, and vice versa). Along this line, it
has been shown that increasing the duration of invisible
stimuli could reverse attractive into repulsive effects
(Barbot & Kouider, 2012; Faivre & Kouider, 2011b; Kanai
& Verstraten, 2005). Beyond stimulus duration, the tempo-
ral dynamics that deﬁned apparent and biological motion
likewise differed: while the temporal structures carrying
the direction of apparent motion ranged from 100 ms to
1200 ms (i.e., different ISIs between disks), those carrying
the gender of point-light walkers ranged from 1 s (i.e.,
one walk cycle in the fast kinematic condition) to 3 s (i.e.,
one walk cycle in the slow kinematic condition). In the lat-
ter case, the critical information driving gender adaptation
effects may be deﬁned by smaller temporal structures (i.e.,
fractions of walk cycle).
Yet, it remains likely that the size of temporal structures
inducing adaptation was smaller for apparent motion than
for biological motion (i.e., 100 ms vs. 1 s), as it was shown
between translational and biological motions in condition
of full visibility (Neri, Morrone, & Burr, 1997). It suggests
that the neurons in the visual cortex involved in the tem-
poral processing of biological motion (possibly in the supe-
rior temporal sulcus (Grossman et al., 2000) and
extrastriate body area (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanw-
isher, 2001)) contain larger temporal receptive ﬁelds (Has-
son, Malach, & Heeger, 2010) than those that compute
apparent motion in MT/V5 and MST (Muckli et al., 2002).
Finally, a last notable difference between the two experi-
mental procedures is the way we measured the processing
of apparent and biological motion adaptors: while we used
continuous reports on a single bistable probe for apparent
motion, we relied on psychometric responses to a set of
ambiguous probes for biological motion.
Nevertheless, the conclusions we derived from these
distinct paradigms are identical: compared to conditions
of full visibility, only temporal structures deﬁned over
short periods of time were able to induce adaptation, both
for apparent and biological motion. We consider two non-
mutually exclusive interpretations for these results. First,
assuming that all other parameters are kept constant,
increasing the ISI of apparent motion or decreasing the
speed of point-light walkers necessarily affects motion
strength (i.e., the illusion of apparent motion decreases
with longer ISI,1 and the point-light walkers appear less
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1977). Therefore, assuming that the sensitivity to motion
signals decreases without awareness, only short temporal
structures containing strong motion signals are likely to give
rise to adaptation. Alternatively, the same phenomenon can
be explained in case weak motion signals are processed de-
spite unawareness, but not maintained over time and there-
fore not integrated into a uniﬁed temporal structure (Blake
& Lee, 2005). Such shrinkage of temporal integration win-
dows without awareness can explain our results indepen-
dently of the sensitivity decrease described above. Let us
examine the different aspects of our results arguing for
one or the other interpretation.
First of all, in the visible conditions of all experiments,
adaptors remained discriminated with very high accuracy
no matter their kinematics. Thus, although differences be-
tween conditions may have remained unnoticed because
of ceiling effects, we can assume that all adaptors carried
sufﬁcient information for conscious discrimination of
apparent and biological motion. Conversely, we showed
that CFS prevented awareness for all the different adaptors,
ruling out the possibility that fast kinematics were more
consciously accessed than slow kinematics. These two
points conﬁrm the basic assumptions that (1) information
of direction (for apparent motion) and gender (for biologi-
cal motion) was available in all visible conditions, and (2)
that motion strength was not confounded with visibility
in the invisible conditions. Furthermore, all the adaptation
effects we found in the visible condition were independent
of motion strength (i.e., ISI for apparent motion, and walk-
ing speed for biological motion), and adaptation to appar-
ent motion was constant despite the linear decrease in the
subjective motion strength. The fact that adaptation does
not decrease with motion strength is probably due to the
existence of a compressive nonlinearity, with adaptation
response saturating at high motion strength (Blake, Tadin,
Sobel, Raissian, & Chong, 2006). Similarly, the fact that
adaptation to visible and invisible apparent motion was
of similar amplitude at high motion strength (i.e.,
ISI = 100 ms) is likely due to response saturation, which
in this case would conceal the decrease of sensitivity under
CFS (the saturation of adaptation responses is unlikely in
case of biological motion, since the effect amplitude
differed between the visible and invisible condition).
Crucially, a reduction of sensitivity to weaker signals under
CFS would predict a linear decrease of adaptation with
motion strength, consistent with the linear decrease of
the apparent motion illusion. The fact that we found a all
or none pattern (i.e., signiﬁcant effect at 100 ms, no effect
beyond 100 ms) makes this hypothesis less likely. On the
contrary, the presence/absence of temporal integration
coupled with the compressive nonlinearity of adaptation
response predicts this all or none pattern: in case the signal
is integrated into a motion percept, it gives rise to adapta-
tion of large amplitudes due to response saturation; in case
the signal is not integrated, adaptation does not occur,
even though the motion strength is high. By contrast, we
found that nonconscious gender priming was of smaller
amplitude in the slow kinematics compared to the fast
kinematics condition (in accordance with the fact that slowpoint-light walkers were discriminated with lower
accuracy in the conscious condition, see results). Thus,
although our results favor a shrinkage of temporal integra-
tion windows as the most probable explanation of our re-
sults, a conjoint decrease in sensitivity to motion signals
may coexist. Future experiments with ﬁner temporal sam-
pling, or experiments compensating the decrease of mo-
tion strength with non-temporal factors (e.g., spatial
conﬁguration of motion stimuli, or attentional ampliﬁca-
tion, see Lu & Sperling, 1995), will be helpful to disentangle
the respective inﬂuence of motion signal strength and
temporal integration during the coding of temporal
structures.
The limit of nonconscious temporal integration can be
accounted for by two qualitatively distinct theoretical
frameworks of consciousness. At an abstract level, the
integrated information theory states that perceptual
awareness depends on the system’s ability to generate
information as a whole (i.e., reducing uncertainty by pro-
cessing speciﬁc physical features), above and beyond infor-
mation generated by the sum of its parts (Tononi, 2010).
While the theory does not directly take into account the
processing of temporal structures, it seems plausible that
within this framework, the consciousness level of a system
should co-vary with its ability to integrate together events
that are far apart in time. Hence, within this framework,
the shrinking of temporal integration for motion process-
ing is expected. Based on neurocognitive evidence, the glo-
bal neuronal workspace model states that conscious access
to a feature (e.g., motion) is associated with the ignition of
recurrent neural activity between sensory regions and a
fronto-parietal network (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). This
model makes the prediction that consciousness is required
for speciﬁc cognitive tasks, including those for which activ-
ity must be ampliﬁed and maintained over a sufﬁcient
duration for it to become accessible to multiple other pro-
cessors. Previous results suggest that subliminal priming
typically becomes undetectable after a few hundreds of
milliseconds (e.g., Mattler, 2005), and that the chaining of
cognitive operations is not possible without awareness
(Sackur & Dehaene, 2009). These two examples involve
all or none criteria, according to which a function is en-
abled in the presence – but not the absence – of awareness.
In comparison, we argue that estimating quantitatively the
extent of temporal integration windows for visible and
invisible stimuli is more powerful in detailing the differ-
ences between conscious and nonconscious vision.
At the neural level, recurrent cortical networks are good
candidates to explain how consciously visible signals are
maintained over long durations. Indeed, such networks
are considered as a potential neural correlate of conscious-
ness (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000), and have been shown to
enable persistent neural activity and temporal integration
(Wang, 2002). According to this view, the limit of noncon-
scious temporal integration may reﬂect the maximal time
during which neural signals carrying the properties of a
temporal structure are sustained when propagated in a
feed-forward manner. Conversely, the ignition of neural
recurrent activity associated with consciousness would
extend this time, resulting in larger temporal integration
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associated with consciousness and integration of multiple
component processes is temporal binding, by which
neuronal discharges are synchronized with a precision in
the millisecond range (Engel & Singer, 2001). Using elec-
troencephalography, it has been shown that when two
stimuli are integrated into a single percept, the event-
related potentials mostly originate from the ﬁrst stimulus,
the second one exerting an inﬂuence mostly in terms of
amplitude modulation (Akyürek & Meijerink, 2012).
Accordingly, this modulation might reﬂect ongoing neural
synchronization of the two successive stimuli, and there-
fore their temporal binding. Together with the behavioral
effects we report, functional evidence for neural recurrent
activity and neural synchronization should help delimiting
conscious and nonconscious temporal integration.
Besides stimulus awareness, attentional ampliﬁcation is
likely to play a role during temporal integration. Notably,
attending to a brief stimulus is known to increase its per-
ceived duration (Yeshurun & Marom, 2008), while attend-
ing to two successive contours is known to increase the
duration over which they can be combined into a single
uniﬁed percept (Visser & Enns, 2001). Accordingly, we pre-
dict that attending to apparent motion stimuli should
extend the duration of ISIs over which adaptation effects
occur, by increasing the activations elicited by the disks,
or decreasing their temporal decay. Similarly, attention
should enhance the capacity to extract gender information
from slow kinematics in point-light walkers (see
Thompson & Parasuraman, 2012 for a review of attentional
effects on the perception of biological motion). Conversely,
attentional ampliﬁcation is also known to degrade tempo-
ral resolution, which is the capacity to discriminate the
transition of static features within a temporal structure
(Yeshurun & Levy, 2003). For instance, attention has detri-
mental effects on the discrimination of short-range appar-
ent motion, deﬁned by short ISIs or spatial displacement
between disks below 1 (Yeshurun & Hein, 2011). As atten-
tion and consciousness are intricate phenomena (Cohen,
Cavanagh, Chun, & Nakayama, 2012; Koch & Tsuchiya,
2007; Lamme, 2003) it would be interesting to assess their
respective inﬂuences on temporal integration and tempo-
ral resolution. Notably, it will be important to test whether
the decrease of integration during nonconscious or
unattended vision generalizes to spatial features (Mudrik,
Breska, Lamy, & Deouell, 2011; Faivre & Koch, in press),
temporal features other than motion (e.g., sequentiality,
causality), and to masking techniques other than CFS
(e.g., gaze-contingent crowding, see Faivre & Kouider,
2011a; Kouider, Berthet, & Faivre, 2011). This will provide
objective measures to quantify perceptual awareness at
the behavioral level, and, help to delimit the fundamental
links between time, attention and consciousness.Authorship
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